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RECENT CASES
Administrative Law-Ripeness-Agency Head's
Informal Opinion Letters Held Unripe for Review
When No Substantial Hardship Placed on Parties
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Plaintiffs, New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Investment
Company Institute (ICI), sued for declaratory and injunctive relief'
against two informal letters of opinion written by Defendant, the
Comptroller of the Currency, to Security Pacific National Bank.3
Plaintiffs opposed the Comptroller's opinion that the bank's pro-
posed automatic stock purchasing service (AIS)4 complied with the
Glass-Steagall Act. 5 Rejecting the Comptroller's threshold argu-
1. Investment Company Institute is a national association of mutual funds, their in-
vestment advisors, and their principal underwriters.
2. See note 5 infra.
3. The letters were written in response to a request by the bank for the Comptroller's
opinion as to whether the bank's proposed automatic stock-purchasing program would be
consistent with §§ 16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act. These sections of the Act strictly limit
the authority of banks to purchase, sell, issue, underwrite, distribute, or otherwise deal in
stocks and securities. Section 16 provides in pertinent part:
The business of dealing in securities and stock by [a national banking] association shall
be limited to purchasing and selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely
upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case for its own account,
and the association shall not underwrite any issue of securities or stock: Provided, That
the association may purchase for its own account investment securities under such
limitations and restrictions as the Comptroller of the Currency may by regulation pre-
scribe.
Banking Act of 1933, § 16, 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1970). Section 21 provides in pertinent part:
(a) . . . it shall be unlawful-
(1) For any person, firm, corporation, association, business trust, or other similar
organization engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing, at
wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, stocks, bonds, debentures, notes,
or other securities, to engage at the same time to any extent whatever in the business of
[deposit banking]: Provided, That the provisions of this paragraph shall not prohibit
national banks ... from dealing in, underwriting, purchasing, and selling investment
securities to the extent permitted ... by the provisions of section 24 of this title ....
12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1) (1970).
4. The bank's proposed "Automatic Investment Service" (AIS) would allow the bank's
regular checking account customers to invest in stocks individually selected by the customer
from a list provided to them by the bank through automatic monthly deductions from their
accounts. The deductions and investments would be made each month until the customer
ended his participation in the program.
5. Security Pacific National Bank first wrote to the Comptroller on February 12, 1973,
describing AIS and inquiring as to its compliance with the Glass-Steagall Act. On February
27, 1973, the Comptroller responded to the inquiry with a letter summarily concluding that
AIS would be consistent with the Act. On August 15, 1973, ICI wrote a letter and supporting
1249
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:1249
ments that the challenged agency action was not ripe for review,
that Plaintiff NYSE lacked standing to sue,' and that Plaintiffs had
failed to join indispensable parties,7 the district court granted sum-
mary judgment for the Comptroller on the merits.' On appeal to the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, held, re-
versed An informal opinion letter issued by a federal administra-
tive agency is not ripe for judicial review when the challenged opin-
ion lacks finality, fails to address a purely legal issue, and places no
substantial and immediate hardships on the parties seeking review.
New York Stock Exchange, Inc. v. Bloom, 562 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
I1. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The basic premise of the ripeness doctrine is that judicial
machinery should operate only on concrete problems that are pres-
ent or imminent, not on problems that are abstract, hypothetical,
or remote.10 Although the doctrine's theoretical objective of judicial
economy is sound, its application in challenges to administrative
actions of government agencies has lacked coherence and consist-
ency. Early courts striving to develop a standard by which to deter-
mine the ripeness of an agency action for judicial review vacillated
between an approach that emphasized the form of a challenged
agency action and one that focused on the effect of the action on the
memorandum requesting the Comptroller to reconsider his position, and NYSE filed a similar
request on September 7, 1973. The Comptroller's office informed Security Pacific of ICI's
request for reconsideration of the February 27 advisory opinion and invited Security Pacific's
comments. Accordingly, Security Pacific submitted a memorandum supporting the February
27 ruling; ICI and NYSE submitted opposing memoranda. On June 10, 1974, the Comptroller
sent a letter to ICI, containing a more extensive analysis of the issues and reaffirming his
opinion that AIS did not violate the Glass-Steagall Act. ICI and NYSE then filed an action
in the District Court for the District of Columbia requesting: (1) a declaratory judgment that
AIS was unlawful under §§ 16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act, and consequently that the
Comptroller's informal opinion of June 10, 1974, exceeded his statutory authority; (2) an
injunction requiring the Comptroller to withdraw his June 10 ruling and to refrain from
"approving" the operation of AIS by any commercial bank; and (3) an injunction forbidding
the Comptroller from "continuing in effect" any "approvals" that may have been given to
other banks. New York Stock Exchange, Inc. v. Bloom, 562 F.2d 736, 737-39 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
6. The Comptroller raised the standing issue only against NYSE in support of his
motion for summary judgment.
7. This claim was not argued on appeal.
8. New York Stock Exhange, Inc. v. Smith, 404 F. Supp. 1091 (D.D.C. 1975).
9. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the decision of
the district court and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the complaint. 562 F.2d
at 743.
10. 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 21.01 (1958).
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parties seeking review. In Standard Computing Scale Co. v.
Farrell," for example, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
"specifications" issued by the New York Superintendent of Weights
and Measures had caused injury to the plaintiff's business, 2 but
held that the specifications were not ripe for review because they
had not been issued in the form of a "regulation" or "law." 3 In
United States v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railway," however, the
Court found an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission af-
fecting interstate carriers unripe for judicial scrutiny because the
order did not impose any obligations, deny any rights, subject the
carrier to any liability, or change the existing or future status of the
carrier. 5 The Court stressed both the effects of delaying judicial
determination on the party opposing agency action and the form of
the challenged action in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
United States." Although the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC) characterized its challenged regulations as merely
"announcements of policy," the Court found that these announce-
ments represented a valid exercise of administrative rulemaking
power and thus were in sufficiently final form for review. 7 The
Court seemed to find more significant, however, the irreparable
injury that would have resulted to the plaintiff if review of the
regulations had been delayed until later proceedings. 8 According to
the Court, the need for immediate review to prevent such irrepara-
ble injury was the "ultimate test of reviewability."' 9 The Court ap-
plied this ultimate test in United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.2"
11. 249 U.S. 571 (1919).
12. The Court noted that, as a result of the specifications, plaintiff's sales had dimin-
ished and collection of payment for scales previously sold had become difficult. Id. at 573.
13. Id. at 577.
14. 273 U.S. 299 (1927).
15. Id. at 310.
16. 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
17. The Court concluded: "When, as here, the regulations are avowedly adopted in the
exercise of [the administrative rulemaking] power [and] couched in terms of command ...
they must be taken by those entitled to rely upon them as what they purport to be-an
exercise of the delegated legislative power .... " Id. at 422.
18. The "irreparable injury" was the wholesale cancellation of contracts by plaintiff's
affiliates that the FCC regulations would induce. Id. at 423.
19. The Court stated:
The ultimate test of reviewability is not to be found in an overrefined technique,
but in the need of the review to protect from the irreparable injury threatened in the
exceptional case by administrative rulings which attach legal consequences to action
taken in advance of other hearings and adjudications that may follow, the results of
which the regulations purport to control.
Id. at 425.
20. 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
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and found that FCC regulations not yet specifically applied to the
plaintiff were nevertheless ripe for review because the plaintiff had
been affected adversely by the regulations."
Even when the courts purported to focus on the effects of ad-
ministrative actions, they continued to emphasize the form of such
actions and often refused judicial review of informal opinions or
announcements adversely affecting the complaining parties. In
Helco Products Co. v. McNutt 2 the Commissioner of Food and
Drugs advised a company wishing to transport dyed poppy seeds in
interstate commerce that such artificial coloring would be illegal
adulteration. The Court held that the informal opinion of the Com-
missioner failed to constitute the requisite controversy for a declara-
tory judgment. Thus the company was faced with the choice of
either complying and suffering injury to its business or not comply-
ing and risking criminal prosecution for such violation. Similarly,
in Public Utilities Commission v. United Air Lines, Inc.,23 the Su-
preme Court refused to review challenged actions of the California
Public Utilities Commission, which had "advised" and
"instructed" United Air Lines to file certain tariffs. The Court re-
fused review because of the informality of the instructions, ignoring
the real and immediate dilemma facing United of obeying the in-
structions and submitting to dual regulation by the Commission
and the Civil Aeronautics Board or violating them and risking a
criminal penalty. Although the complaining parties in these cases
had a vital interest immediately threatened by either informal
agency action or delay of judicial determination until enforcement
proceedings, the courts exhibited an insensitivity to the plights of
the parties and a preoccupation with formality. 2
In 1956 the Supreme Court broke'through the formality barrier,
conceding that form could be outweighed by effects. The Court
stated in Frozen Food Express v. United States2 that the interest
of a court and an agency in postponing review of an administrative
action until the question arises in a more concrete and final form
can be outweighed by the interests of those seeking relief from a
21. The regulations were in effect controlling the plaintiff's business affairs; he could
not plan to enlarge the number of his stations because the FCC, on the basis of the rules,
denied his application for an additional station. Id. at 199-200.
22. 137 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
23. 346 U.S. 402 (1953).
24. See also Longshoremen's Local 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954); Eccles v. Peoples
Bank, 333 U.S. 426 (1948); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
25. 351 U.S. 40 (1956).
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challenged action's "immediate and practical impact". upon them."
The Court extended this pragmatic approach to the effects of ad-
ministrative actions on parties in Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,21
in which it reviewed the constitutionality of an administrative
agency's informal exhortations even though the agency had no au-
thority to impose any formal, legal sanctions. Recognizing that the
agency's informal exhortations effectively regulated the types of
books sold by the party seeking review," the Court looked beyond
the legal form of the agency action to its substance and held that
such action had a sufficiently material effect on the party to warrant
review.
The Supreme Court articulated a more definitive standard for
determining ripeness in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner.2' Espous-
ing what it considered to be the basic rationale of the ripeness doc-
trine, avoidance of premature adjudication of discretionary admin-
istrative policies, 3 the Court established a procedure for evaluating
the ripeness issue in challenges to administrative actions. The
Abbott Laboratories standard required evaluation of both the fit-
ness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties
of withholding court consideration. The Court considered two fac-
tors in finding the regulations challenged in Abbott Laboratories"1
fit for judicial determination. First, the Court emphasized that the
issue presented was a "purely legal" one and did not require review
of any factual determinations traditionally left to the finder of fact.2
Second, the Court found the regulation in question to be "final
26. Id. at 44.
27. 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
28. Id. at 68-71. Rhode Island set up a "Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth,"
which made "informal recommendations" to book distributors as to books unsuitable for sale
to children. The recommendations often were followed by threats of prosecution for distribut-
ing obscenity; consequently, distributors were effectively discouraged from selling such books.
Thus the plaintiff-publisher was injured by the distributors' refusal to distribute the books
in question and their steps to stop further circulation of such books. See id. at 61-64.
29. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
30. The Court concluded:
[Tihe ripeness doctrine's . ..basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through
avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagree-
ments over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial inter-
ference until an administative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a
concrete way by the challenging parties.
Id. at 148-49.
31. The case involved a challenge to regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of
Food and Drugs.
32. The court noted that all parties agreed that the issue was purely legal-whether the
Commissioner's regulations had construed properly a statute-without trying to justify or
attack the regulations in factual terms. Id. at 149.
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agency action" because it was promulgated in a formal manner after
public announcement and considerable deliberation and because
there was no evidence that it was intended to be informal or tenta-
tive. Applying the second part of its standard, the Court decided
that the impact of the regulation upon the petitioners' conduct of
their business affairs was sufficiently "direct and immediate" to
require prompt judicial review.13 With its decision in Abbott
Laboratories, the Supreme Court thus began examining form and
effect concurrently, rather than alternating between form in one
case and effect in the next 4.3
Lower courts repeatedly have followed the A b bott Laboratories
standard.35 The District of Columbia Circuit adopted the standard
and applied it in National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council
v. Schultz (NALCC), 31 finding ripe for review a letter from the Ad-
ministrator of the Wage-Hour division to the NALCC. 37 Evaluating
the fitness of the issue for judicial scrutiny, the court found the issue
to be "purely legal" 8 and the administrator's opinion to be final
agency action.31 The court indicated that an informal agency opin-
ion is presumptively final for review if it is approved by the agency
head, arises out of substantial deliberation, is not labeled as tenta-
tive or otherwise qualified by arrangement for reconsideration, is
likely to be accepted as authoritative, and has the feature of ex-
pected conformity." The court also found that delaying judicial
scrutiny would result in sufficient hardship on the plaintiffs to jus-
tify immediate review.41
33. Petitioners were faced with the costs of compliance, adapting their promotional
material and labeling to the regulation's requirements, or the risks of noncompliance, serious
criminal and civil penalties. Id. at 152-53.
34. Id. at 149, 153.
35. See, e.g., Atlantic Richfield Co. v. FTC, 546 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1977); A.O. Smith
Corp. v. FTC, 530 F.2d 515 (3d Cir. 1976); Banker's Life & Cas. Co. v. Callaway, 530 F.2d
625 (5th Cir. 1976); Florida v. Weinberger, 492 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1974); Air Line Pilots'Ass'n
Int'l v. Department of Transp., FAA, 446 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1971).
36. 443 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
37. NALCC is a national trade association for the coin-operated laundry and dry clean-
ing industry.
38. The issue was whether the Administrator properly had construed 1966 amendments
to the Fair Labor Standards Act. 443 F.2d at 695.
39. The NALCC court dealt with finality not in its analysis of fitness of the issues for
review, but as an issue independent of the fitness issue. See also Bethlehem Steel v. EPA,
536 F.2d 156 (7th Cir. 1976); Banker's Life & Cas. Co. v. Callaway, 530 F.2d 625, 631 (5th
Cir. 1976); Independent Bankers' Ass'n of America v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
A.O. Smith Corp. v. FTC, 530 F.2d 515, 521 (3d Cir. 1976). UntilAbbott Laboratories ripeness
and finality often were treated as separate issues.
40. 443 F.2d at 701-02.
41. Similar to the situation of the plaintiffs in Abbott Laboratories, the plaintiffs in
1254 [Vol. 30:1249
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In Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB4 2 the District of Columbia
Circuit again applied the A b bott Laboratories standard in examin-
ing CAB orders establishing a new seating configuration policy. In
regard to fitness of the issues for judicial review, the court found the
issue to be a question of proper statutory construction and therefore
"purely legal."43 The court stated that the label an agency attaches
to its actions is not determinative of finality, and consequently, that
an action may be reviewable even though it is merely an announce-
ment of a rule or policy not yet put into effect by the agency or one
that will never have any formal, legal effect." The court noted,
however, that if a challenged agency position is likely to be aban-
doned or modified before actuelly put into effect, it is not the
agency's final position and review will waste the court's time.45 Fo-
cusing on the hardship to the parties, the court found that both the
financial burdens of compliance-the costs of changing seating con-
figurations in airplanes-and the risk of sanctions for noncompli-
ance caused sufficient injury to the plaintiff to necessitate immedi-
ate review.' Thus Abbott Laboratories' concern with fitness of the
issues for review and hardship on the parties contesting an agency
action has become the established standard for determining ripe-
ness for judicial review in suits challenging administrative actions.
III. THE INSTANT OPINION
Deeming the ripeness issue to be determinative in the instant
case," the court expressed its adherence to the Abbott Laboratories
standard in its examination of the ripeness for judicial scrutiny of
the Comptroller's letters of opinion. The court first dealt with the
question of the finality of the Comptroller's action in evaluating the
fitness of the action for review. Although the court acknowledged
that the letters were signed by the agency head and that the second
letter contained an extensive analysis based on consideration of
adverse legal memoranda, it stressed the informality of the letters
NALCC faced the dilemma of incurring the adverse financial consequences of compliance or
risking the litigation and penalties of noncompliance. Id. at 696-97.
42. 522 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
43. The statute being construed was the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 401(e)(4), 49
U.S.C. § 1371(e)(4) (1970).
44. 522 F.2d at 124.
45. Id. at 125.
46. Id. at 126-28.
47. The other issues before the court-the threshold issue of standing and the substan-
tive issue of the Comptroller's opinion, the compatibility of AIS with the Glass-Steagall
Act-were not decided.
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and the tentative nature of the Comptroller's interpretative conclu-
sions.48 The court also recognized that the Comptroller had stated
what appeared to be a relatively final position on the consistency
of AIS with the Glass-Steagall Act.4" It reasoned, however, that this
position, based only on a proposed AIS program, would be compati-
ble with any future finding, based on evidence from AIS's actual
operation, that it generated hazards sufficient to create a violation
of the Act. 0 The court thus concluded that the letters were not
formal rules or policy statements and distinguished them from the
opinion letter in NALCC.15
The court next addressed the second criterion for assessing the
appropriateness of an agency's actions for judicial review and re-
jected the lower court's finding that the Comptroller's opinion re-
sponded to a "purely legal" question. The court acknowledged that
determining the congressional intent behind the enactment of the
Glass-Steagall Act would be solely a matter of law, but it stated that
determining whether AIS would come within the scope of legislative
concerns would require an assessment of facts surrounding the ac-
tual operation of AIS and an application of law to those facts. 51
Concluding that the challenged agency action was unfit for
judicial resolution, the court turned to the problem of hardship to
the parties. The court compared the effect on NYSE and ICI of
withholding judicial review with the injury to the plaintiffs in
Abbott Laboratories, NALCC, and Continental Air Lines53 and
found that Plaintiffs in the instant case had not made a sufficient
showing of substantial and immediate hardship from either the
Comptroller's action or the deferral of judicial review until the is-
48. The court concluded that the letters of opinion reflected their tentative nature in
that the Comptroller reserved the option of changing his opinion. 562 F.2d at 741.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. The court found it significant that the letter in NALCC expressed a statutory
interpretation that could be deemed final and conclusive because it was based on legislative
history alone. To the contrary, the court felt that the Comptroller's letters reserved the
possibility that he might change his position if presented with concrete factual evidence that
MIS produced conditions that the Glass-Steagall Act was intended to prevent. Id. See also
note 38 supra and accompanying text.
52. Id.
53. The court noted the severe alternatives faced by the plaintiffs in these three cases.
To obtain later judicial review, they would have had to accept the adverse consequences of
complying with agency rulings or risk serious penalties and possible prosecution for noncom-
pliance. The court found no such dilemma before Plaintiffs NYSE and ICI since they were
not directly regulated by the agency and the agency action was not applicable to them. Id.
See also notes 33, 41 & 42 supra and accompanying text.
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sues were more concrete.54 The court rejected both the district
court's assumption that denial of immediate review would preclude
the Plaintiffs' claim from ever coming under judicial examination5
and the Plaintiffs' contention that to require the initiation of nu-
merous private actions against banks offering AIS would be unduly
burdensome.56 Finding neither fitness of the issues for judicial scru-
tiny nor sufficient hardship to the parties from withholding court
consideration, the court held the Comptroller's challenged action
unripe for review.
IV. COMMENT
The instant court's analysis of the ripeness issue represents a
retreat from Abbott Laboratories' pragmatic concern for hardship
to the parties to the restrictive concern for formality evidenced in
early decisions. 57 The court's narrow application of the Abbott
Laboratories standard upsets the balance between the form of an
agency action and the effect on the parties of withholding judicial
review that the standard was intended to create. Consequently, par-
ties threatened with irreparable injury from adverse agency opinions
may be denied access to the courts because the challenged action
cannot be categorized as a "law," "regulation," or "final order."
Such a formalistic approach overlooks the immediate and substan-
tial harm that can result from agency action that may never have
any formal, legal effect on the parties. 8
In applying the Abbott Laboratories standard in the instant
case, the court deviated from its earlier application of the standard
in NALCC and Continental Air Lines. Its conclusion that the
Comptroller's opinion letters were tentative and therefore unfit for
judicial review ignores the NALCC principle that a letter signed by
an agency head, not tentative on its face and growing out of substan-
tial deliberation, is "presumptively final" for purposes of judicial
review even though the agency legally could reconsider the opin-
ion.5' This principle, together with the court's recognition that the
54. The court noted that the Plaintiffs' conduct was not regulated directly by the
Comptroller's action. 562 F.2d at 741.
55. The court hinted that Plaintiffs would have a right of private action against banks
offering AIS and similar programs. Id. at 742.
56. The court suggested that a single successful private action might be equally effec-
tive in convincing the Comptroller to alter his position regarding AIS. Id.
57. See notes 11-13 supra and accompanying text.
58. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
59. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
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disputed opinion appeared to be final,60 was being relied upon as
official, and actually was encouraging banks to institute AIS pro-
grams, demonstrates that the letters were sufficiently final for judi-
cial review. The court's refusal to characterize the statutory con-
struction question decided by the Comptroller as "purely legal" is
equally untenable since the statutory interpretation in the instant
case involves no more factual determination than did the statutory
construction questions in Abbott Laboratories, NALCC, and
Continental Air Lines, all of which were held to be purely legal.'
In addressing the second part of the Abbott Laboratories stan-
dard, which focuses on the impact of adverse agency action on the
parties, the court once again departed from the pragmatic approach
evidenced in recent cases. The court found only insubstantial hard-
ship on the Plaintiffs because their conduct was not regulated di-
rectly by the agency action in question and because they were not
faced with having to choose between burdensome compliance and
risky noncompliance.12 The inconsistency of this reasoning is appar-
ent. Because the agency action was favorable to those directly regu-
lated by the agency, banks offering AIS, only nonregulated parties
would be injured by the Comptroller's opinion letters. Conse-
quently, under the court's rationale, the Comptroller's opinion
would never be subject to review since the resulting hardship suf-
fered by nonregulated parties, the only parties who would seek re-
view, would be deemed insufficient for judicial consideration. The
court's analysis ignores that, at the time of the challenge, banks
were offering AIS to customers as a direct result of the Comptroller's
letters, thereby injuring NYSE and ICI, who previously had been
free of bank competition in security sales.
In disposing of Plaintiffs' contention that denial of review
would result in substantial hardship, the court "supposed" that
Plaintiffs would have a right of private action by which to address
injuries caused by banks providing AIS without making any conclu-
sive determination whether the express language of the statute au-
thorized such an action.13 The court's conclusion that the inconveni-
ence of having to initiate numerous private actions was not a hard-
ship sufficient to justify immediate review" is inconsistent with the
60. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
61. See notes 32, 38 & 42 supra and accompanying text.
62. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
63. See 562 F.2d at 742.
64. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
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principle of judicial economy " since less of the court's time would
be spent in immediately reviewing the merits of a challenged action
than would be spent in deciding a potentially large number of pri-
vate suits.
Policy considerations mandate liberal application of the Abbott
Laboratories standard to allow hardship on the parties to outweigh
respect for formality. Current concern over protection of individual
rights necessitates that the courts risk expending their energies on
a possibly premature issue to avoid closing their doors to those who
actually might be injured by agency action. If the balance between
form and injury is close, deference should be given to the party
alleging injury. Courts must acknowledge the adverse effect that
even informal expressions from administrative agencies may have
on a person or his business, as evidenced by the injury to the busi-
nesses of NYSE and ICI. Courts also must recognize that parties
affected by adverse agency action naturally consider such action as
authoritative and proceed in their affairs in reliance on this belief
without deliberating as to whether the action is "final."66 Preen-
forcement review at the request of those who have an interest in
adjudication of an agency action should be allowed to prevent or
mitigate possible losses. 7
The desire to avoid judicial examination of hypothetical or ab-
stract claims, which supports a strict application of the ripeness
doctrine, does not require that injured parties be denied judicial
review. Courts striving for judicial economy might better expend
their time and energy by examining the merits of challenges to
agency action instead of becoming engrossed in semantics and form
in evaluating ripeness6 8 If no real controversy exists, courts should
be able to dispense with a complaint in terms of standing, real party
in interest, appropriate remedies, and in only the most obvious
65. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
66. The general public is not concerned with the form of agency actions. When a govern-
ment official espouses some policy or opinion, people respect it as being official without
considering whether it is a "regulation," "order," "informal opinion," or "announcement of
policy." The burden of making such distinctions should not be on the public; rather, agency
officials should make their intentions obvious. See generally note 17 supra and accompanying
text.
67. It is only logical that banks desiring to initiate AIS programs would want to know
if their proposed programs would be compatible with existing laws and regulations before
incurring the extensive costs of putting them into operation.
68. Since the parties are before the court and the court most likely has read their briefs
and is familiar with the facts and arguments of each party, perhaps the court should examine
the merits of the case instead of occupying its time with the threshold ripeness issue.
19771 1259
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cases, ripeness." Liberal application of the Abbott Laboratories
pragmatic approach to the issue of ripeness will afford review to
parties suffering injury from adverse agency action unless the injury
is obviously insubstantial and remote.
CORNELIA H. BOOZMAN
Civil Procedure-Res Judicata-Challenge of
Racial Discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981
Barred by Prior Submission of Civil Rights
Question to State Court
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Plaintiff, a black female, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981,1
alleging that her dismissal by Defendant2 was the result of racial
discrimination. Defendant sought dismissal of the suit, claiming
that affirmance by the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court of the dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint by the State Division
of Human Rights3 had res judicata effect barring a section 1981
action seeking similar relief. Plaintiff asserted that procedural inad-
69. In the instant case, the court should have found the injury to the Plaintiffs' business
sufficient to warrant immediate review. A satisfactory outcome could also have been reached,
however, by forcing Plaintiffs to join banks already offering AIS as indispensable parties.
Certainly the court could not have denied the impact of the agency's position on those parties,
justifying the need for immediate review of a real controversy.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evi-
dence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punish-
ment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
In addition to suing under § 1981, a victim of racial discrimination could seek judicial relief
under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), or the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970), or he could file a complaint with a state agency or with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1970).
Mitchell v. National Broadcasting Co., 553 F.2d 265, 277 (2d Cir. 1977) (Feinberg, J., dissent-
ing).
2. Plaintiff, employed by Defendant National Broadcasting Company on March 13,
1972, was placed on probation for thirty days on October 17, 1973, allegedly because of poor
work performance and an uncooperative attitude, and was formally dismissed on November
19, 1973.
3. Pursuant to N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 297 (McKinney 1972), Plaintiff first challenged her
dismissal before the New York State Division of Human Rights, an administrative agency
with broad authority to eliminate unlawful discriminatory practices.
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equacies in the state administrative and judicial proceedings4 and
the substantial policy considerations5 supporting federal civil rights
actions should preclude application of res judicata in a section 1981
action. Finding that the state administrative and judicial proceed-
ings barred a subsequent action under section 1981, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York dis-
missed the action.' On appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, held, affirmed. Voluntary submission of a civil rights question
to a state court has res judicata effect barring a subsequent federal
challenge under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Mitchell v. National Broadcast-
ing Co., 553 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1977).
H. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In Southern Pacific Railroad v. United States7 the Supreme
Court stated that a "right, question, or fact" distinctly put in issue
and directly determined by a court acting within its jurisdiction
cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties.'
4. Division proceedings consisted of two conferences with two different officials of the
Division in which Plaintiff, Defendant's attorneys, and the officials engaged in "informal
discussions." Plaintiff was not represented by counsel and apparently presented no docu-
mented evidence supporting her position. The attorneys for Defendant submitted documents
in the form of office correspondence and oral testimony to support its position. The Division
officials found no probable cause to believe that Defendant had discriminated against Plain-
tiff. Pursuant to N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 297-a (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1976), Plaintiff appealed
to the State Human Rights Appeal Board, an adjudicatory authority independent of the
Division of Human Rights. The Appeal Board's scope of review was limited by § 297-a(7) to
determining whether the decision of the Division was: (a) in conformity with the constitution
and the laws of the state and the United States; (b) within the Division's jurisdiction; (c)
made in accordance with required procedures; (d) supported by substantial evidence; and (e)
not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Plaintiff also filed a charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1970). Although find-
ing no probable cause, the Commission issued Plaintiff a right-to-sue letter. Finally, Plain-
tiff petitioned the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, pursuant to N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 298 (McKinney 1972) and N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§ 7801-7806 (McKinney 1972)
to set aside the. Appeal Board's decision, compel reinstatement, and award back pay. The
Appellate Division, limited under § 298 in its review by the findings of fact in the administra-
tive proceedings, unanimously affirmed the decision of the Appeal Board. Under § 298, the
Appellate Division's decision is final, subject to review only by the New York Court of
Appeals. Plaintiff did not seek such review.
5. Recognized policy considerations include the importance of agency conciliation ef-
forts in civil rights litigation and the undesirability of allowing the state proceedings encour-
aged by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to preempt claims brought under § 1981.
6. Mitchell v. National Broadcasting Co., 418 F. Supp. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
7. 168 U.S. 1 (1897) (two previous Supreme Court cases held to have finally determined
the rights contested in the case at bar).
8. Id. at 48. A corollary to this rule is that it is immaterial whether the prior decision
was decided correctly; only a showing of lack of jurisdiction over the question will defeat the
application of res judicata. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940).
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The principle of res judicata articulated by the Southern Pacific
Court reflects "considerations of economy of judicial time and pub-
lic policy favoring the establishment of certainty in legal relations."9
The Court in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. 10 recognized the plight of
overburdened federal tribunals faced with collateral challenges to
state court decisions on federal questions and extended the principle
of res judicata, ruling that federal courts must apply res judicata to
state court determinations of federal questions once the state court
assumes jurisdiction of the federal issue. In addition, the Court has
determined that 28 U.S.C. § 1738," which requires the federal judi-
ciary to grant state court decisions the same full faith and credit due
them in the state of their origin, requires federal courts to consider
the res judicata effect of a state court proceeding within that state."2
Furthermore, the Court has acknowledged that res judicata may
preclude federal court adjudication of issues resolved in administra-
tive proceedings." The Court has indicated, however, that the doc-
trine does not necessarily compel federal court deferral to state court
decisions on federal issues or to administrative determinations. Al-
though the Court in England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical
Examiners" held that res judicata attaches when a plaintiff volun-
tarily submits a federal question to a state court, 5 it distinguished
9. 168 U.S. at 48-61.
10. 263 U.S. 413 (1923). Following Supreme Court refusal to review a state court deci-
sion, plaintiffs challenged the results of the state action in federal district court, claiming the
state decision violated the contract clause and the fourteenth amendment of the Constitu-
tion. The Court held that a state court decision on a federal question properly before it could
not be attacked collaterally in federal court; appeal to the United States Supreme Court
provided the only relief available. See also Becher v. Contoure Laboratories, Inc., 279 U.S.
388 (1929) (Court recognized as binding under collateral estoppel a state court decision
despite a grant to the federal courts of exclusive jurisdiction in patent infringement cases).
But see note 15 infra and accompanying text.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970) provides in part:
Such Act, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated (by
seal or certification), shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the
United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the
courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they were taken.
12. See Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 349 (1942) (construing the predeces-
sor to § 1738).
13. United States v. Utah Constr. and Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966) (dispute over
delay damages and alleged added work before the Advisory Board of Contract Appeals prior
to a court challenge).
14. 375 U.S. 411 (1964). Appellants, Louisiana chiropractors challenging the educa-
tional requirements of the Louisiana Medical Practice Act, brought suit in the Louisiana
courts after the federal district court abstained pending the decision of a state law issue. Once
in the state court, the appellants presented and argued federal as well as state questions. After
an adverse decision and a futile appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court, appellants sought
to reassert their claim in federal district court.
15. The Court held that although plaintiffs were forced into state court by federal
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the situation in which a plaintiff is forced through appeal by an
opposing party or by a federal court's temporary abstention to liti-
gate a cause of action in state court that necessarily involves a
federal question. In United States v. Utah Construction and Mining
Co. '8 the Court suggested that res judicata should attach to admin-
istrative decisions only when an agency acts in a judicial capacity
and the parties have an adequate opportunity to litigate the issues.1 7
The Court also has acknowledged that congressional intent to
provide a federal forum may require flexibility in the application of
res judicata. In Kalb v. Fuerstein" the Court ruled that a grant of
exclusive jurisdiction indicated a congressional intent that the fed-
eral courts retain plenary power. Thus the failure of a party to
litigate an issue in state court was held not to have binding effect
in a federal action." Relying on Kalb, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in Denver Building and Construction Trades
Council v. NLRB ° held that res judicata should not apply if the
result would be inconsistent with procedures for relief established
by Congress.2 '
Courts have recognized that policies supporting a federal forum
for civil rights claims may override the application of res judicata.
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,22 an employment discrimina-
abstention on a state question, res judicata attached since plaintiffs had voluntarily submit-
ted the federal question in state court.
16. 384 U.S. 394 (1966).
17. Id. at 422.
18. 308 U.S. 433 (1940).
19. The Court held that the language and broad policy of the exclusive grant ofjurisdic-
tion to the federal courts in bankruptcy proceedings was sufficient to override the application
of res judicata. The Court's holding seems to conflict with the holding of Becher. The Court,
however, did not rule that a grant of exclusive jurisdiction necessarily precludes res judicata;
exclusive jurisdiction merely indicates congressional intent to provide a federal forum. Pre-
sumably congressional intent would be weighed against the need for finality in each case.
20. 186 F.2d 326, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1950), rev'd on other grounds, 341 U.S. 675 (1951) (order
of the National Labor Relations Board challenged in the court of appeals subsequent to a
related district court decision).
21. Congress established a procedure by which unfair labor practices faced preliminary
challenge before the federal courts and final determination before the NLRB. See also
American Mannex Corp. v. Rozands, 462 F.2d 688 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040
(1972); Lyons v. Westinghouse, 222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955). In
American Mannex, an action by Louisiana taxpayers contesting the validity of the state
property taxes, the court recognized the principle of res judicata (called "judicial estoppel"
in Louisiana). It indicated, however, that "other well-defined federal policies, statutory or
constitutional, may compete with those policies underlying section 1738." 462 F.2d at Q90.
22. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). Petitioner alleged racial discrimination as the cause of his
discharge from employment and brought an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The United States District Court for
the District of Colorado granted the employer's motion for summary judgment on the grounds
that the issue of discrimination had been resolved in a previous arbitration.
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tion suit under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Court
recognized that Congress intended to give the policy against racial
discrimination the "highest priority"' by allowing an individual to
pursue his rights under Title VIl24 independently of relief available
under other state and federal statutes. 5 Finding that Congress had
given the federal courts final responsibility for the enforcement of
Title VII, 26 the Court held that neither the submission of issues to
an arbitrator nor the presence of parallel or overlapping remedies
precludes de novo federal review under Title VII.
In Taylor v. New York City Transit Authority2 the court con-
sidered the res judicata effect of an administrative proceeding on a
federal civil rights action. Recognizing that res judicata should not
be applied mechanically9 to administrative determinations, the dis-
trict court listed three factors for determining whether res judicata
should attach to decisions of a state administrative body: (1) the
effect accorded such determinations by the courts of the jurisdiction
in which they are made; (2) the type of hearing held and the proce-
dures followed by the agency; and (3) the intention of the adminis-
trative body and the expectations of the parties on the question of
finality. 0 Administrative proceedings generally have not affected
subsequent federal actions under Title VII. In Batiste v. Furnco
23. 415 U.S. at 47.
24. Id. While § 1981 provides in general for full and equal benefit of the law for all
persons, Title VII is directed specifically against employment discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Title VII further provides explicit regulations and
standards for avoiding employment discrimination and creates the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission to enforce and implement the Title VII provisions. See note 1 supra.
See also Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 461 (1975) (Title VII and §
1981 augment each other and are not mutually exclusive).
25. The Court specifically referred to § 1981 and 1983 as remedies paralleling the Title
VII remedies. 415 U.S. at 47 n.7.
26. Id. at 44.
27. Id. at 47, 49. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Court described circum-
stances allowing federal intervention in a state criminal proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
The Court held that a federal civil rights action could be brought only when there was danger
of irreparable harm to the defendant's rights. In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592
(1975), the Court remanded a district court decision for failing to apply the Younger standard
of extraordinary circumstances to civil actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While these cases
indicate the reluctance to override res judicata, the reasoning of Alexander and other civil
rights actions, discussed infra, is more relevant to the instant case.
28. 309 F. Supp. 785 (E.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 433 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1970). Plaintiff, discharged
for alleged misconduct involving violence, previously had challenged his dismissal before the
Civil Service Commission.
29. 309 F. Supp. at 791. The court stated that the required balancing is especially
delicate when an individual's constitutional rights must be weighed against respect for the
state's adjudicatory system.
30. Id. The court stated that several factors might be considered, but specifically listed
the three noted in text.
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Construction Corp.31 plaintiffs brought a Title VII action after an
appeal by defendant to the state circuit court caused the stay of an
administrative order.3 2 Finding that res judicata had been "squarely
rejected" in a Title VII action subsequent to a final state adminis-
trative determination, 3 the court held that Congress intended that
the federal courts engage in de novo review of a Title VII claim even
when state proceedings have reached a final determination. 4 In
Benneci v. Department of Labor35 the district court refused to apply
res judicata in a Title VII action although the plaintiff had appealed
an adverse decision of the Division of Human Rights to the Appel-
late Division of the New York Supreme Court .3  Relying on
Alexander,3 the court ruled that affirmance by the Appellate Divi-
sion was irrelevant because that court could not engage in de novo
review.3 1
Courts have recognized that section 1981 provides a remedy for
victims of racial discrimination similar to that provided by Title
VII.3 Furthermore, in Hollander v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.4" the dis-
31. 1503 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1974).
32. The Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission had ordered defendant to
cease and desist discriminatory employment practices. Defendant's appeal to the state court
automatically resulted in a temporary stay of the Commission's order. The appeal was still
pending when the federal action was before the court of appeals.
33. See Cooper v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 464 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1972) (the circuit court
rejected the application of res judicata to agency action in a Title VII action).
34. 503 F.2d at 450. See also Voutsis v. Union Carbide Corp., 452 F.2d 889 (2d Cir.
1971).
35. 388 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
36. Plaintiff first filed a complaint with the Division of Human Rights, was represented
by counsel before a Division hearing, and was defeated. He then appealed to the State Human
Rights Appeal Boid, which affirmed the decision. Finally, pursuant to N.Y. EXEc. LAw §
298, he appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the decision of the Board of
Appeal. See also Young v. South Side Packing Co., 369 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (findings
of state agency in a racial discrimination action under Title VII held not binding although
affirmed by state court).
37. See notes 22-27 supra and accompanying text.
38. 388 F. Supp. at 1082. The Second Circuit also has declined to apply res judicata in
an action under § 1983, which forbids deprivation of civil rights under color of state law. In
Lom bard v. Board of Education, 502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 976 (1975),
the circuit court held that policy considerations precluded the application of the doctrine
when plaintiff claimed that a prior agency hearing violated his fourteenth amendment right
to due process. The court also found that plaintiff could not have raised his due process
challenge in the agency hearing and that he was not required to raise the issue in his appeal
to the state court. But see Hanzimanolis v. Codd, 404 F. Supp. 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd
mem., 538 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1976) (when plaintiff had raised a federal civil rights question in
a prior state judicial proceeding, the district court held that he could not raise the same claim
under § 1983).
39. See, e.g., Windsor v. Bethesda Gen. Hosp., 523 F.2d 891 (8th Cir. 1975) (§ 1981
applicable to private actions for employment discrimination based on race); Sanders v. Dobbs
Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971) (employee
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trict court held that state court affirmance of an agency action
dismissing plaintiff's complaint under section 1981 because of im-
proper service on the defendant did not bar further litigation." Ana-
lyzing the administrative proceedings, the court found that the ab-
sence of a hearing or opportunity for plaintiff to argue his version
of the facts precluded the application of res judicata to the agency
determination.42 By providing a de novo hearing for plaintiff's claim
of racial discrimination, the Hollander court recognized that res
judicata might not attach in a section 1981 action and further that
a federal court may look past a state court affirmance and review
the proceedings of a state agency. Thus, prior to the instant case,
federal courts applied res judicata in civil rights actions only after
the plaintiff had received a judicial hearing comparable to a de novo
federal action.
III. THE INSTANT OPINION
Applying the Southern Pacific "right, question, or fact" stan-
dard, the instant court43 ruled that the state judicial proceedings
had res judicata effect barring Plaintiffs action under section 1981.
The court found the agency standards for determining the existence
of probable cause for Plaintiff's racial discrimination claim 41 identi-
cal to the standards a federal court would apply in considering a
motion for summary judgment or a motion to dismiss for failure
discharged allegedly because she was black could state a claim against a private employer
under § 1981).
40. 392 F. Supp. 90 (D. Conn. 1975) (alleged racial discrimination against a white male
who applied for an internship with defendant's program for minority students).
41. 392 F. Supp. at 95. The state court dismissed the appeal because of untimely and
improper service in the state action. Since the dismissal was not on the merits, the district
court held that it should not bar a subsequent action. The court cited § 49 of the Restatement
of Judgments, which states:
Where a valid and final personal judgment not on the merits is rendered in favor of
defendant, the plaintiff is not thereby precluded from thereafter maintaining an action
on the original cause of action and the judgment is conclusive only as to what is actually
decided.
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 49 (1942).
42. The Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities dismissed plain-
tiff's complaint based on the findings of a state investigator that the complaint lacked eviden-
tiary support. Because of the investigator's determination, the Commission did not conduct
a hearing or give plaintiff any opportunity to present his complaint.
43. The opinion of the court was by Mishler, District Judge, with Lumbard, Circuit
Judge, joining.
44. The Division was required to determine within fifteen days after the complaint was
filed whether there was probable cause to believe that the person(s) named in the complaint
committed unlawful discriminatory acts. Mitchell v. National Broadcasting Co., 553 F.2d
265, 270 (1977).
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to state a claim.45 Stating that neither res judicata nor the full faith
and credit requirements of section 1738 depend upon the absence of
error,4 the court noted that Plaintiff's action challenged the merits
of the state decision rather than the standard applied. Nevertheless,
the court examined the sufficiency of the agency hearing, conclud-
ing that the agency procedures provided a full and fair hearing on
the legal sufficiency of Plaintiff's claim.47 The court applied the
remainder of the Taylor standard to the state judicial proceedings, 4
reasoning that the finality of the Appellate Division review and
Plaintiff's decision to seek review supported the application of res
judicata.
The court recognized that policy considerations overriding the
application of res judicata in a Title VII action might be relevant
to a section 1981 claim, 41 but dismissed these policy arguments be-
cause Plaintiff could have presented her case to the appropriate
state agency without seeking judicial review and still brought a
section 1981 action in federal court. Drawing a distinction between
state administrative and judicial proceedings, the court held that
res judicata attached only when a plaintiff chose to appeal the ad-
ministrative decision to the state courts. 50 The court found no reason
to believe that the resolution by the state court would be any less
appropriate than resolution in a federal proceeding, thus dismissing
Plaintiff's contention that Congress contemplated overlapping state
and federal actions.51
Accepting arguendo the majority's position that a state court
decision normally should have res judicata effect, the dissent" con-
tended that the policy considerations present in a racial discrimina-
tion case override the section 1738 rule. The dissent saw no reason
45. See FED. R. Cry. P. 12(b) & 56.
46. 553 F.2d at 272. The court cited Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
47. The court noted that before the Division of Human Rights may dismiss a complaint,
it must be apparent that the complaint lacks merit as a matter of law. Further, the Division
is required to give full credence to the complainant's version of events. 553 F.2d at 272-73.
48. Id. at 273. The court's use of the Taylor standard in regard to the court proceedings
is incongruous with the purpose of the standard, since the Taylor standard was designed for
analysis of administrative rather than judicial proceedings.
49. The court cited Gresham v. Chambers, 501 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1974), in support of
the position that policies affecting Title VII actions could be relevant to an action under §
1981. 553 F.2d at 275. The court in Gresham found that Title VII was intended to supplement
§ 1981, not to serve as a substitute for it. 501 F.2d at 691.
50. 553 F.2d at 276. The court apparently followed the holding in England v. Louisiana
State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964), requiring that the consideration by the
state court be the result of voluntary submission by the plaintiff in the federal action.
51. 553 F.2d at 276. See notes 22 & 34 supra and accompanying text.
52. Judge Feinberg dissented. 553 F.2d at 277-80.
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to distinguish the remedies provided by Title VII and section 1981
and asserted that the congressional intent to provide a federal fact-
finding forum recognized in Benneci applies equally to an action
under section 1981. Since the state court decision merely affirmed
the results of an informal agency investigation in which Plaintiff
had not been represented by counsel, the dissent contended that the
policies supporting de novo review should be given particular em-
phasis. In the absence of an independent inquiry into the merits by
a state court,53 the dissent argued that the federal courts should be
particularly reluctant to grant res judicata effect to the state court
determination.
IV. COMMENT
By mechanically applying the doctrine of res judicata and em-
phasizing Plaintiff's voluntary resort to the state judiciary, the in-
stant court fails to implement the high priority established by Con-
gress for the correction of racially motivated employment discrimi-
nation. The court's application of the Taylor standard to the com-
bined administrative and judicial proceedings does not inspect pro-
perly the nature of the agency action standing alone 4 and leaves
future courts without a workable test for determining the applica-
tion of res judicata in civil rights cases.
Although purporting to examine the type of hearing used by the
agency, the court ignores the importance of the procedures used in
that hearing.5 The "informal discussions"56 conducted by the Divi-
sion of Human Rights in the absence of counsel for Plaintiff are not
the type of hearings that automatically should be accorded the sig-
nificance of a judicial proceeding. 5 The standards used by the Divi-
53. The dissent evidently failed to recognize that on a motion under rules 12(b)(6) or
56, there would have been no requirement of a determination of the facts, even if the case
had been in federal court.
54. Strict adherence to the court's interpretation of § 1738, that application of res
judicata is required once the state court has acted, should not allow review of the agency
action. The procedure of the state agency should not have affected the application of res
judicata, since other state courts would have accorded the court decision res judicata effect
in any event.
55. The second part of the Taylor standard calls for examination of the procedures used
a well as the type of hearing held.
56. See note 4 supra. It is not clear exactly what procedures were used in the agency
hearing. Although the court compares the hearings to those used in determining a motion for
summary judgment or to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the description of the
proceedings includes the presentation of documentary evidence on the part of NBC. If evi-
dence was presented, the hearings were at least not strictly comparable to proceedings under
rules 12(b)(6) and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
57. The court's description of the Division of Human Rights proceedings suggests that
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sion in reaching its conclusion are irrelevant if the procedures fol-
lowed do not afford the protections of a court hearing. Furthermore,
by weighing the finality of the court proceedings rather than the
finality of the agency hearing, the court improperly grants to the
Division hearings the weight of a court trial."
In analyzing the policies that might override the application of
res judicata in a civil rights claim, 59 the court draws an artificial
distinction between plaintiffs who are forced to adjudicate federal
issues in state court and those who voluntarily submit federal claims
to the state judiciary. The court in Hollander did not impose a
requirement that the resort to state court be involuntary, yet the
instant court summarily dismissed the relevant policy considera-
tions because Plaintiff could have stopped short of state judicial
review. Implicit in the court's decision is a failure to recognize the
position expressed in Alexander that federal remedies for employ-
ment discrimination are independent of state actions.6 0
The dissent, in contrast, properly recognizes that policies sup-
porting the availability of federal forums must be given great weight
in a civil rights action, but fails to emphasize the standards for
determining whether such policy considerations are sufficient to
override the policies supporting res judicata. 1 Although briefly dis-
cussing the relevance of Alexander, Benneci,6 2 and other Title VII
cases to a section 1981 action, the dissent does not analyze the
holdings of those cases to create a basis for its position that Congress
intended to provide both state and federal remedies for victims of
employment discrimination and that the policies supporting a Title
VII action also support an action under section 1981. Its ad hoc
analysis of the application of res judicata in such cases fails to
present a strong case for a de novo federal proceeding. "
Plaintiff was confronted with evidence presented by counsel for NBC in two different
"discussions" held by two different officials. There is no indication that Plaintiff was aware
of the requirements that she show probable cause for her complaint or that she knew that
the findings of the hearings themselves could foreclose another action.
58. By interspersing discussion of the agency hearing with the judicial proceedings, the
court also avoided discussion of the state court's inability to make its own determinations of
fact. See note 4 supra.
59. See text accompanying notes 23-27 supra.
60. See notes 23-26 supra and accompanying text. Although Alexander was a Title VII
case, the policies applying to it were conceded by the court to be relevant to a remedy under
§ 1981. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
61. See text accompanying notes 23-27 supra.
62. It is surprising that the dissent did not rely on Hollander or rely more heavily on
Benneci once it determined that the policies behind Title VII are comparable to those sup-
porting § 1981.
63. The dissent also failed to discover the weakness of the court's analysis of the admin-
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The better course would be to follow the holding in Hollander
and determine first whether a state court decision should be granted
res judicata effect standing alone. The second step in a case such
as Mitchell, in which there is only limited review by a state court,
would require full analysis by the district court of the administra-
tive proceeding, utilizing the three factors articulated in the Taylor
standard. 4 The court should give particular attention to the second
part of the Taylor test, which compares the type of agency proceed-
ing and the procedural protections in that proceeding with those
available in a federal court. If the Taylor requirements are met by
the administrative proceeding, the court should, as a final step,
analyze appropriate policy considerations to determine whether
congressional intent precludes the application of res judicata.
Application of the foregoing analysis to the instant case reveals
that res judicata should not have precluded federal adjudication of
Plaintiff's section 1981 challenge. Since the state court proceedings
consisted only of affirmance after limited review, 5 the administra-
tive proceedings should have been examined under the Taylor test.
Absent counsel for Plaintiff and formal procedures similar to those
provided in a court proceeding,66 the agency hearings could not pro-
vide the same opportunity for relief available in a court action and
thus should not have been accorded the weight of a full court hear-
ing. Finally, the court should have reviewed the policy considera-
tions recognized in Alexander and applied them to the instant
case.67 The evident congressional intent to provide a federal forum
in employment discrimination cases should have been sufficient to
override the application of res judicata, especially in light of the
informal nature of the state administrative hearings. That Plaintiff
chose to bring her federal action under section 1981 rather than Title
VII is irrelevant since in either case congressionally recognized pol-
icy calls for an available federal remedy. The instant court's appli-
cation of res judicata despite contrary policy considerations could
result in more limited access to the federal courts in civil rights
actions.
R. PRESTON BOLT, JR.
istrative proceedings under the Taylor standard. By accepting arguendo the court's position
that res judicata should apply in the absence of countervailing policies, the dissent ignores
that Plaintiff was not accorded a hearing of the same type available in court.
64. See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
65. See note 4 supra.
66. Id.
67. Although policy considerations may change depending on the type of case before
the court, the court's concession that policies applicable in Alexander are relevant to the
Mitchell case should provide a sufficient basis for determining the policies to be considered
in a § 1981 action.
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Environmental Law-Standing to Sue-Alleged
Violation of Private Party's Informational
Interest in Environmental Impact Statement is
Sufficient to Establish Standing to Enforce
National Environmental Policy Act
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Plaintiffs' sought a declaratory judgment that a final environ-
mental impact statement (EIS)2 filed by defendant 3 Corps of Engi-
neers failed to comply with the requirements of section 102(2) (C) of
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 4 Defendant filed
a motion to dismiss, arguing that a private party could not enforce
section 102(2)(C)'s EIS requirement for proposed legislation and
that plaintiffs did not have standing to enforce section 102(2)(C)
because they had not alleged an injury in fact5 sufficient to satisfy
the constitutional "case or controversy" requirement. The United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, held, Defendant's
motion denied. Because section 102(2)(C) of the NEPA confers on
the public a right to environmental impact information, private
parties may enforce the section, and loss of information caused by
a violation of the section is an injury in fact sufficient to establish
standing in members of the public desiring environmental informa-
l. This case consolidated for trial two suits against the same defendant. Plaintiffs in
each suit included one named and several unnamed parties. The named plaintiffs were the
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway and the Izaak Walton League of America, an environ-
mentalist organization.
2. The purpose of an environmental impact statement is to provide information on the
environmental repercussions of proposed legislation and other major federal actions.
3. The named defendant in each case was Howard H. Calloway, a representative of the
United States Corps of Engineers.
4. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)
(1970), provides in relevant part:
(2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall-
(c) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and
other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and
the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would
be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
5. For a discussion of this requirement, see note 31 infra and accompanying text.
6. For a discussion of this limitation, see notes 20-21 infra and accompanying text.
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tion. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. Callaway, 431 F.
Supp. 722 (D.D.C. 1977).
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA requires that federal agencies in-
clude an EIS "in every recommendation or report on proposals for
legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment."7 Although the statute does
not specify a procedure for enforcing section 102(2)(C), several
courts have allowed private parties to enforce its EIS requirement,
An analysis of the cases reveals a two-fold approach9 to the issue.'0
First, the courts have determined that Congress, in passing section
102(2)(C), intended not only to acquire information for itself, but
also to provide environmental information to the public. Second,
the courts have relied upon the provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act" that authorize judicial review of an agency's ac-
tions.
The majority of cases allowing private suits to enforce section
102(2)(C) have concerned an EIS accompanying a proposal for
7. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412
U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 395 F. Supp. 1187 (D.D.C. 1975), af'd, No. 75-1781
(D.C.Cir. Mar. 8, 1976); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 342 F. Supp. 1211
(E.D. Ark.), aff'd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973); Izaak
Walton League of America v. Macchia, 329 F. Supp. 504 (D.N.J. 1971).
9. The approaches used by these courts do not conform to the format that the United
States Supreme Court set forth in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In that case the Court
articulated four general factors that a court should consider in determining whether a private
party may enforce a statutory mandate if the statute does not provide for a private remedy.
Under Ash a court should consider:
(1) whether the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was
enacted.
(2) whether the legislature intended to create such a-remedy.
(3) whether an inference of such a remedy is consistent with the underlying purposes
of the legislation.
(4) whether the cause of action is traditionally related to state law so that to infer a
cause of action based solely upon federal law would be inappropriate.
Id. at 78. Although the analyses used by the courts prior to Ash to allow private parties to
enforce § 102(2)(C) did not follow the format later set forth in Ash, the courts did consider
the factors articulated in the Ash decision; therefore the decisions should remain as valid
precedent even after the decision in Ash.
10. Courts generally combine the discussion of whether any private party may enforce
§ 102(2)(C) with the discussion of whether the particular plaintiff in each case has satisfied
the requirements of the standing doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
11. Administrative Prodecure Act § 10(a), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1966) provides: "A person
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."
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agency action.'2 Three cases, however, have considered whether pri-
vate parties may enforce the EIS requirement for proposed legisla-
tion. The courts in Sierra Club v. Morton 3 and Environmental De-
fense Fund v. TVA" allowed private parties to enforce the require-
ment.' 5 The only decision to the contrary is Wingfield v. Office of
Management and Budget, 6 in which the court, without analysis,
stated that a private party did not have a right to enforce the section
102(2) (C) EIS requirements for legislative proposals." Because sec-
tion 102(2) (C) does not distinguish between proposals for legislation
and proposals for agency action in its EIS requirement, and because
the Wingfield opinion fails to justify its departure from cases allow-
ing private rights of action to enforce EIS requirements, courts prob-
ably will continue to allow private parties to enforce the require-
ment for proposed legislation.
In each of the cases addressing the issue whether a private party
may enforce the section 102(2)(C) EIS requirement, the court also
had to resolve the more difficult and important issue of whether
the particular plaintiff had standing to sue. Although the two issues
12. See, e.g., Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 541 F.2d 442 (4th Cir. 1976); Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 342 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973).
13. 395 F. Supp. 1187 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd, No. 75-1781 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 8, 1976).
14. 339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972).
15. The courts in Sierra Club and Environmental Defense Fund did not specifically
address the question whether a private party could enforce the EIS requirements of §
102(2)(C) for proposed legislation. One must assume, however, that in allowing the private
parties in the cases to enforce § 102(2)(C) the courts in fact considered the question and
answered it in the affirmative.
16. 7 ENvIR. REP. 20,362 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 1977).
17. In Wingfield the plaintiff requested an injunction to prevent congressional commit-
tees from obtaining information relating to proposed legislation prior to the filing of an EIS.
The analysis by the Wingfield court, which led to its conclusion that a private plaintiff may
not enforce EIS requirements for proposed legislation, is as follows:
This particular provision [section 102(2)(C)], however interpreted, was designed
solely to aid the Congress and was not intended to create a right of action in a private
party to claim injury in some fashion from the ongoing legislative process.
Congress has within its own investigatory and other resources ample means to
obtain from the Executive whatever information it desires relating to environmental
impact prior to taking action. It is clear, of course, that Congress did not intend to
stultify itself by this legislation if at any point it was satisfied it had enough information
to proceed in a given situation.
The ability of Congress by various means at its disposal to obtain whatever environ-
mental information it deems necessary to perform its function is, of course, undisputa-
ble.
For the court to interject itself into the complexities of the ongoing legislative
process at the behest of a private party would require the clearest kind of directive from
Congress, which is not present here.
Id. at 20,362-63.
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are inherently intertwined,'8 the standing issue has proven to be a
more stringent resit iction on a private party's ability to bring an
action to enforce section 102(2)(C). The doctrine of standing to
sue is a combination of constitutional and prudential considerations
that operate to limit access to federal courts. The principal under-
pinning of the doctrine is the Constitution's requirement 20 that an
issue be presented in the form of a case or controversy in order to
invoke the authority of the federal judiciary.21 The essence of this
requirement is that a plaintiff must allege a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy in order to assure that the issues are
presented with adverseness. 22 The Supreme Court has recognized
that this "personal stake in the outcome" is the constitutional
minimum required for standing under article 111.23
In addition to the constitutional requirement, the Supreme
Court has recognized certain prudential considerations that further
limit a plaintiff's right to bring suit in federal court. 4 A federal
court, for example, will not hear a case if the plaintiff is using the
federal judiciary to air general grievances25 or if the case is not
presented in an adversary context.21 In Flast v. Cohen 7 the Court
expressly recognized that these prudential considerations are part
of the doctrine of standing.
Relying upon the combination of constitutional and prudential
18. Courts presently apply a two-part test to determine whether a plaintiff has standing
to sue. See note 31 infra and accompanying text. Under the second part of the test a plaintiff
must be within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the statute. The question
whether any private party has a right to sue to enforce a statutory requirement is closely
related to and involves many of the same considerations as the question whether a particular
plaintiff is within the zone of interests that are protected by that requirement.
19. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Sadler y. 218 Housing Corp.,
417 F. Supp. 348 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Concerned About Trident v. Schlesinger, 400 F. Supp. 454
(D.D.C. 1975).
20. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
21. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803).
22. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
23. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968).
24. See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
25. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,499 (1975); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.
166, 175 (1974); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 448 (1923).
26. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). Although the requirement that issues
be presented in an adversary context is one of the constitutional underpinnings of the stand-
ing doctrine, it also may raise prudential considerations. Because the purpose of the require-
ment is to assure that issues are presented in a form suitable for judicial resolution, courts
are able to exercise much discretion in deciding when the requirement has been met. It is in
this area of discretion that the requirement becomes a prudential consideration.
27. 392 U.S. 83, 97-98 (1968).
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considerations, courts for many years took a restrictive position on
the issue of standing. The courts held that prudential and constitu-
tional considerations required a plaintiff to allege an invasion of a
legal interest in order to acquire standing to sue 2 and thus severely
limited the category of persons who could acquire standing on a
particular issue.
In 1970 the Supreme Court embarked on a line of decisions that
greatly modified and relaxed the doctrine of standing. In Data Pro-
cessing Service v. Camp2 the Court indicated that invasions of aes-
thetic, conservational, recreational, or economic interests also can
provide a basis for standing. The Court devised a two-pronged test
for standing, requiring a plaintiff to show both injury in fact
"economic or otherwise," 0 and injury to an interest within the zone
of interests protected by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question.3 1 Applying this test in Barlow v. Collins,32 the Court
granted standing to a plaintiff who would not have been allowed to
bring suit under prior interpretations of the standing doctrine.3 3 Two
years later the Court in Sierra Club v. Morton,34 although denying
standing on the basis of a "mere interest" in the environment, indi-
cated that if a plaintiff alleged an invasion of his own aesthetic or
recreational interests, he would have standing." The Court's relaxa-
tion of the standing requirements culminated in United States v.
28. See, e.g., Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
29. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
30. Id. at 152.
31. The zone of interest prong of this test primarily addresses prudential considerations.
The injury in fact prong, however, concerns constitutional restrictions on standing. The Court
required injury in fact to assure that the plaintiff had a sufficient "personal stake in the
outcome" to satisfy the case or controversy limitations placed on standing by article III.
Courts continue to use the injury in fact test to determine whether a plaintiff has met the
constitutional minimum required for standing. Although both prongs of the Data Processing
Service test have been applied frequently since their inception in 1970, courts have applied
each prong with differing degrees of stringency depending upon the United States Supreme
Court's attitude toward standing at the time.
32. 397 U.S. 159 (1970) (decided the same day at Data Processing Service).
33. The district court in Barlow, relying upon prior interpretations of the standing
doctrine, had denied standing because the plaintiff did not allege a direct invasion of a legal
right. The plaintiffs in Barlow were tenant farmers who challenged a ruling of the Secretary
of Agriculture on the grounds that it indirectly affected their ability to obtain credit. Applying
the two-part test of Data Processing Service, the Court took a liberal position and granted
standing on the basis of this alleged economic injury.
34. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
35. In Sierra Club an environmentalist group challenged the building of a recreational
facility in a national game refuge. In an attempt to satisfy the requirements of the standing
doctrine the group stated that it had a general interest in the conservation of national parks
and game refuges. Even though the Court refused to grant standing on these grounds, it
indicated that if the group or any of its members had alleged invasions of an aesthetic interest
in or recreational uses of the area, standing would have been granted.
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Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),31 in
which the court granted standing to plaintiffs who alleged only indi-
rect and hypothetical injuries to their aesthetic and recreational
interest in the environment.3 1
The Court further relaxed the standing doctrine by recognizing
that Congress, within the limits set by article I of the Constitu-
tion,38 could create standing in plaintiffs who otherwise could not
meet the requirements of the standing doctrine. In Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,3 the Court acknowledged the
plaintiff's standing on the basis of a right of review granted by the
Civil Rights Act of 1968,1o even though standing would have been
denied in the absence of the statute. The Court suggested in Data
Processing Services that section 10(a) of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act,41 which authorizes judicial review of federal agencies' ac-
tions, could likewise give standing to persons adversely affected by
an agency's decisions. Further, in Hardin v. Kentucky Utility Co.42
the Court indicated its willingness to infer a statutory grant of
standing if the language of a statute and its legislative history
clearly manifest Congressional intent to provide a right of review to
those in plaintiff's class. 3
The cumulative result of these Supreme Court rulings was a
substantial weakening of the doctrine of standing. By the time of
the SCRAP decision in 1973 the doctrine had been relaxed to the
point that some district courts felt it no longer provided a significant
restriction on access to the federal judiciary.4 In three recent cases,
36. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
37. SCRAP involved a challenge to an EIS filed under section 102(2)(C) of NEPA. The
plaintiff, a student environmentalist group, gained standing by alleging that a proposed
railroad freight surcharge on recyclable goods would increase the use of, and therefore the
littering of, nonrecyclable goods, thereby damaging the environment in the parks in the
District of Columbia area, which plaintiffs claimed they used for recreational purposes.
38. For a discussion of these limits, see notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text.
39. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1970) provides in relevant part:
(d) If within thirty days after a complaint is filed with the Secretary or within thirty
days after expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c), the Secretary has
been unable to obtain voluntary compliance with this title, the person aggrieved may,
within thirty days thereafter, commence a civil action in any appropriate United States
district court, against the respondent named in the complaint, to enforce the rights
granted or protected by this title, insofar as such rights relate to the subject of the
complaint.
41. For the text of this section, see note 11 supra.
42. 390 U.S. 1 (1968).
43. The Court suggested that Congress' intent to give a particular plaintiff or class of
plaintiffs a right to bring an action must be clearly apparent before a congressional grant of
standing will be inferred.
44. Reservists Committee to Stop the War v. Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833 (D.D.C. 1971),
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however, the Supreme Court halted relaxation of the standing doc-
trine. The Court denied standing in United States v. Richardson,45
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War," and Warth
v. Seldin,4 7 stating that a plaintiff still must demonstrate injury in
fact to establish standing. The Court also indicated that prudential
considerations were important factors in any decision on the issue
of standing." In Richardson the Court denied the plaintiff standing,
relying in part on its determination that the plaintiff was seeking
admission to a federal court merely to air his generalized griev-
ances.49 In addition, the Court in Warth and Reservists determined
that a plaintiff's alleged injury must be sufficiently concrete and
immediate in order to provide a basis for standing." Thus these
three cases indicate that the doctrine of standing continues to be a
significant restriction on a plaintiff's right to sue in" federal court.
Since the passage of NEPA in 1970, courts have decided ques-
tions of standing to enforce its provisions under the general rules
applicable to the doctrine of standing." Although early cases resolv-
ing questions of standing to enforce NEPA, such as SCRAP, were a
part of the pattern of relaxation of the doctrine of standing,5 2 recent
district court decisions have followed the Supreme Court's trend
toward a more stringent application of the doctrine's limitations . 3
III. THE INSTANT OPINION
Before reaching the issue of standing, the court first considered
whether any private plaintiff has a cause of action to enforce the
section 102(2)(C) EIS requirement for legislative proposals. 4 The
rev'd sub nom. Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
See Broderick, The Warth Optional Standing Doctrine: Return to Judicial Supremacy?, 25
CATH. U.L. REv. 467 (1976); 27 HASTINS L.J. 213, 222 (1975).
45. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
46. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
47. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
48. See id. at 499; United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 175.
49. 418 U.S. at 175.
50. 418 U.S. at 220 (concrete injury is an indispensable element of a dispute capable of
judicial resolution); 422 U.S. at 516 (plaintiff "failed to show the existence of any injury...
of sufficient immediacy .... ").
51. See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412
U.S. 669 (1973); Sadler v. 218 Housing Corp., 417 F. Supp. 348 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
52. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., Sadler v. 218 Housing Corp., 417 F. Supp. 348 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Concerned
About Trident v. Schlesinger, 400 F. Supp. 454 (D.D.C. 1975); Citizens for Food and Progress,
Inc. v. Musgrove, 397 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
54. The instant court addressed this issue as one of first impression. While there was
significant authority for the proposition that EIS requirements for a federal agency's actions,
proposals, and hearings could be enforced by private action, the court indicated that the EIS
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court immediately faced the Wingfield decision, which had denied
a private party the right to enforce section 102(2) (C) of NEPA as it
related to proposed legislation. The court, however, distinguished
Wingfield from the instant case by noting that the relief requested
by the plaintiff in Wingfield would have interfered significantly
with the legislative process, unlike the declaratory judgment re-
quested in the instant case. 5 Next considering whether a private
party could enforce section 102(2) (C) under the instant circumstan-
ces the court focused upon the purpose of the section and its EIS
requirements and analyzed numerous cases" interpreting the sec-
tion. The court found that each case indicated that one purpose of
the section was to provide information to the public in order to
encourage private participation in governmental decisionmaking.
Noting that this interpretation was consistent with the language of
NEPA, the court agreed that a major purpose of the EIS require-
ment for legislative proposals was to provide the public with infor-
mation in order to permit participation in decision-making pro-
cesses.
The court then focused upon the provisions of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act 57 that authorize judicial review of a federal
agency's actions. On the basis of this authorization and its holding
that the public had an informational interest in an EIS, the court
held that the EIS requirements of section 102(2) (C) relating to legis-
lative proposals are enforceable by private suit.
Moving to the issue of standing, the court first noted that sec-
tion 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act granted a right of
judicial review to persons "adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency actions within the meaning of a relevant statute."" Reiterat-
ing its holding that one purpose of section 102(2) (C) was to provide
information to permit public participation in decisionmaking and
also noting that plaintiffs were interested in the proposed legislation
requirements for legislation pending in Congress might require different considerations. But
see note 15 supra and accompanying text.
55. While agreeing with the Wingfield court that § 102(2)(C) did not establish a private
right of action to interfere with the legislative process, the court suggested that a request for
a declaratory judgment involved different considerations. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Calla-
way, 431 F. Supp. 722, 727 n.5 (D.D.C. 1977).
56. Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1975); Trout Unlimited v. Morton,
509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974); Jones v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency,
499 F.2d 502 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 927 (1975); Silvia v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282
(1st Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn.), aff'd,
468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972).
57. For text of this section, see note 11 supra.
58. Administrative Procedure Act § 10(a), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
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associated with the Corps of Engineers' EIS, the court held that the
alleged violations of section 102(2)(C) adversely affected plaintiff's
interests, and therefore plaintiffs were entitled to judicial review
under the Administrative Procedure Act. Finally,5 the court consid-
ered the constitutional "case or controversy" limitations on stand-
ing and the requirement of injury in fact." Relying again on its
statement of the purpose of section 102(2)(C), the court held that
the alleged violations of the plaintiff's informational interests
granted by the section were sufficient allegations of injury in fact
to establish standing to sue.
IV. COMMENT
The instant court's holding that the section 102(2)(C) EIS re-
quirement may be enforced by a right of private action is consistent
with the language of section 102(2)(C)I1 and the majority of cases
allowing private parties to enforce its EIS requirement. The court's
use of this holding, however, to grant the plaintiff's standing to sue
in the instant circumstances conflicts with decisions such as
Richardson, Reservists, and Warth, which limit access to the courts
by a strict application of the standing doctrine. The decision on
standing is based upon the theory developed in Data Processing
Service, Trafficante, and Kentucky Utility Co. that Congress has
the power to establish standing in private parties to enforce congres-
sionally created rights. " The court, however, fails to recognize that
even when a private party sues to enforce statutory rights, both
constitutional and prudential limitations continue to operate as a
barrier to standing. The court correctly notes that an injury in fact
is required to establish standing, but by holding that violations of
the public's informational interest in an EIS satisfy this require-
ment, it disregards the prudential considerations expressly recog-
nized by the Supreme Court.63
In both Richardson and Warth the Supreme Court stated that
generalized grievances shared by the public at large were not a
59. In addition to the standing issue, the court, at the end of its opinion, summarily
addressed the question whether it could shape appropriate relief. Holding that a declaratory
judgment would be sufficient under the circumstances, the court decided the question in the
affirmative.
60. For a discussion of the background of this requirement, see notes 20-24 & 31 supra
and accompanying text.
61. For the text of this section, see note 4 supra.
62. For a discussion of this theory, see notes 39-43 supra and accompanying text.
63. See notes 24-26 supra and accompanying text.
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sufficient injury in fact to establish standing." The policy underly-
ing the injury in fact requirement is that generalized grievances do
not assure that the plaintiff has sufficient interest in an issue to
present it with the "concrete adverseness"65 required for judicial
review. Adherence to this position may, at times, place particular
issues outside the realm of judicial review, but, as the Supreme
Court has correctly recognized, such issues are generally best suited
for resolution by either political process or the legislative or execu-
tive branch of government.66
Although section 102(2)(C) of NEPA grants to the public an
interest in EIS information, the interest is vested in the public as a
whole, and any violations of the interest are common to every indi-
vidual and organization. Consequently, in order to establish stand-
ing to redress violations of this informational interest, a plaintiff
must show some additional injury. Cases such as Data Processing
Service, Sierra Club, and SCRAP have established that invasions
of a person's aesthetic or recreational interests may constitute this
necessary additional injury. Plaintiffs who have acquired standing
through such an injury in fact may validly enforce the public's
informational interest granted by section 102(2) (C).17 The court's
holding, however, that invasion of a general informational interest
alone is sufficient to bestow standing disregards the limitations of
the standing doctrine that recently have been reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court. Although informational interests are a valid con-
cern of every individual and organization in today's society, any
injuries caused by a violation of these interests should be redressed
through the legislative or executive branch of government rather
than through the federal judiciary.
KENNETH L. STEWART
64. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.
166, 175 (1974). See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
65. Baker v. Carr, 396 U.S. at 204.
66. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179.
67. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. at 737.
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